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Abstract 
Contributors to the debate on ethical rationing bring with them assumptions about the proper 
role of moral theories in practical discourse which seem reasonable, realistic and pragmatic.  
These assumptions function to define the remit of bioethical discourse and to determine 
conceptions of proper methodology and causal reasoning in the area.   However well 
intentioned, the desire to be realistic in this sense may lead us to judge the adequacy of a 
theory precisely with reference to its ability to deliver apparently determinate answers to 
questions that strike most practitioners and patients as morally arbitrary.  By providing ethical 
solutions that work given the world as it is, work in clinical ethics may serve to endorse or 
protect from scrutiny the very structures that need to change if real moral progress is to be 
possible.  Such work can help to foster the illusion that fundamentally arbitrary decisions are 
“grounded” in objective, impartial reasoning, bestowing academic credibility on policies and 
processes, making it subsequently harder for others to criticise those processes.  As theorists, 
we need to reflect on our political role and how best to foster virtuous, critical practice, if we 
are to avoid making contributions to the debate that not only do no good, but may even be 
harmful.  A recent debate in this journal illustrates these issues effectively. 
 
Keywords 
bedside rationing, clinical ethics, bioethical methodology, critical practice, virtue, priority-
setting, politics, social progress, causal reasoning/responsibility, justice 
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“The reasonable man adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying to 
adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on the unreasonable man.”(GB 
Shaw)
1
 
 
All questions contain assumptions: this is uncontroversial.  If we ask a particular British 
celebrity whether or not he has stopped abusing children then we risk being sued, as our 
question logically presupposes that he once abused children.  The more complicated or 
nuanced the question, the more difficult it may be to spell out its assumptions.  Clinical 
bioethicists will agree that the sort of questions they ask about how to ration 'realistically' and 
'ethically' contain assumptions, but may regard those assumptions as reasonable, because they 
reflect the realities of the health care systems and practices they aim to affect.
2, 3
 
 
I have argued that academics, including economists and moral philosophers, need to identify, 
and subject to careful critical scrutiny, their own assumptions when they theorise about such 
practices.
4-6
   Our goal may be to provide methods of argument or analysis to improve the 
decision-making processes that determine practice.  But in the real contexts we aim to affect, 
our work may fail to do any positive good, and may even be harmful.
4
(p158)  In some cases, 
the attempt to 'solve' a particular problem 'ethically' may serve to endorse or protect from 
scrutiny the very structures that need to change if real moral progress is to be possible; 
unchallenged (because apparently reasonable) assumptions can function to distort the process 
of moral reasoning, thereby discouraging virtuous and critical practice. (op cit.)  By providing 
certain 'realistic' solutions to practical problems, meaning ones that work given the world as it 
is, theorists advising governments, local authorities and professional bodies can help to foster 
the illusion that fundamentally arbitrary decisions and constraints have the support of, or are 
grounded in, “objective, impartial reasoning informed by experts”. (ibid. p182) This in turn 
Page 3 of 21 Clinical Ethics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Proof
4 
can promote a mentality I characterised as “formalism”,(ibid. pp199,232) whereby 
practitioners with context-specific knowledge are encouraged to think of their own moral 
intuitions, developed via an interaction with their patients, as merely “subjective” reactions, in 
contrast to such impartial reasoning.  Whether intended or not, the political role of the 
theorist, I argued, was often to “bestow academic credibility” on policies and processes, 
making it subsequently harder for others to criticise these processes – where “others” included 
patients demanding the best care available, and professionals attempting to “defend their 
corner”, to protect their traditional values and practices from random transformation to suit 
the prevailing political currents and economic agendas. 
 
The debate in this journal between Wyller
7, 8
 and Magelssen et al 
3
 suggests to me that these 
concerns are still very relevant to on-going debates in clinical ethics.  Wyller's attempt to 
“defend his corner” as a clinician leads to his being perceived as either ignorant or in denial of 
certain realities; as unreasonably refusing to change his practices in the light of those realities; 
or as wedded to theoretical approaches that are in fact not adequate for sound practical 
reasoning.  In other words, he is either insufficiently realistic, or insufficiently 
practical/pragmatic, or both.  So, for instance, his insistence that “scarcity in healthcare” is the 
result of political factors and not simply “a given” is taken by his critics to reflect an 
ignorance of, or refusal to admit (“let on”) the true, “pervasive” nature of the “phenomenon” 
of rationing.
3
(p2)  His scepticism about the attempt to apply universal moral principles to 
determine “fair” decisions in particular cases, and his claim that the outcomes of any such 
reasoning process are likely to be morally “arbitrary” (Wyller
7
 p258, cited by Magelssen et 
al,
3
 p6) provokes an answer that is helpful in revealing his critics' own fundamental 
assumptions about the proper role of moral theories in practical discourse.  As we will see, 
they effectively stipulate that a “sound ethics of physician-patient relationship” must 
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“accommodate” the fact that rationing is “unavoidable”, where “accommodating” this fact 
includes providing practical guidance – non-arbitrary answers – to questions about how to 
ration in particular cases. 
 
The unreasonable man 
In fact, it seems to me, Wyller's role in this exchange is that of Shaw's “unreasonable man”.  
However well intentioned, his critics' attempts to get him to conform to the project of 'bedside 
rationing' are part of a process that stifles protest and undermines complaint on the part of 
those either working within health systems, or users of the systems who feel disadvantaged by 
being on the losing side of a given resource-allocation decision.  Hence their somewhat 
disparaging comments about “sentimentality spurred by heart-wrenching stories of individual 
patients or groups”, in contrast to the rationality of an overall system founded on “general 
principles... decided upon through a fair and transparent process.”(p5)  While they do not 
deny that there can be a “tragic” aspect to the outcomes of rationing decisions,(p5) the very 
existence of developed theories of just rationing, accompanied by evidence that the rationing 
process was “performed explicitly and in line with justified moral principles”(p2) serves to 
break the link between that sense of tragedy, the patient's feeling that her current situation is 
“unfair” and any conclusion to the effect that she has suffered a genuine injustice.  When all 
the ethically and pragmatically endorsed policy calculations have been performed, there is a 
remainder, a 'left-over' feeling that injustice at the personal level has been defined out of 
existence to enable the ascription of 'justice' at the impersonal, societal level.  This is what 
frustrates and distresses the quite properly compassionate professional. 
 
Magelssen et al recognise this sense of unease and concede that rationing procedures may 
“mask the residual dimension” of regret at the “loss of the very real goods”(p4) that were 
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promised by the de-prioritised possibilities.  Even so, the logic of their position dictates that 
they regard this outcome as “unfortunate” rather than unjust.  While we might kindly overlook 
the patient's linguistic error in claiming that her preventable suffering is “so unfair”, if that 
suffering is the outcome of a “systematic approach to priority setting”(p4) then in the sense 
that matters (the sense that determines action) she is (on this view) strictly incorrect.  It's 
regrettable, unfortunate, even tragic – but not unjust.  For if we were to admit that an outcome 
was at once unjust and unavoidable given the system as it is, then this would have the radical 
implication that that system needed changing as a matter of the utmost moral urgency, 
because it necessitates injustice – and this possibility seems to be one ruled out as beyond the 
scope of a 'pragmatic' debate meant to inform practitioners in the real world. 
 
Defenders of 'bedside rationing' believe that reasonable practitioners will operate with a 
realistic sense of what is affordable given the resource base for the system as a whole, and 
will not demand more for their patients merely because they are their patients.  From their 
perspective, clinicians like Wyller are being partial in a morally problematic sense elicited by 
the characteristically Kantian question: 'what if everybody did that?'  If the outcome of 
everybody's refusal to 'ration at the bedside' would stretch the health system's resources 
beyond its politically determined limits, then Wyller is either being unreasonable (or indeed 
unjust) in asking for more for his particular patients than for others, or he is simply being 
unrealistic regarding what the system can sustain.  What this approach to clinical ethics takes 
as “given”, then, is the fact of “scarcity” in the sense of the particular, finite limits allocated to 
health care in the economic system within which the practitioner must operate.  These 
economic facts effectively provide the moral framework for the debate: they form the basis 
from which all thinking about what it is reasonable to ask for on behalf of one's patients 
should begin, thus marking out the remit of the debate about bedside rationing. 
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Other questions (crucially including, how much of a society's economic base should be 
devoted to providing health care) are not illegitimate; they are just part of a different debate.  
Magelssen et al see no contradiction in Wyller agreeing to 'ration at the bedside', while 
remaining one of those clinicians “who decry what they perceive as the underfunding of 
healthcare”(p4).  Indeed, he should be “eager to support efforts to instigate transparent 
priority setting based on morally justified criteria and procedures... until he succeeds in 
convincing the electorate and the politicians that healthcare funding must be increased 
dramatically.” (op.cit)  It is not that they want to dismiss his political views about the 
underfunding of healthcare, or any other views he might have about the irrational, wasteful 
and grotesquely unequal distribution of resources and expenditure within the developed 
national economies of the world and the global economy.  It is just that those questions are 
beyond the remit of the debate about rationing in clinical ethics, where the question is: given 
the resources in fact available, how do we set priorities ethically? 
 
What is not clear is why, given these limitations, any non-arbitrary answer to the question of 
how to ration justly should be possible in the sort of controversial cases where the authors 
regard guidance from ethical theory as being needed.  To take an example considered by 
Magelssen et al (p3) and discussed at greater length below, suppose some health policy-
makers have to decide whether to prioritise spending on reconstructive surgery for breast 
cancer patients who have undergone mastectomy or surgery for children with cleft lip and 
palate.  To suggest that one can use some theoretical device, be it Kantian moral theory, 
Rawlsian conceptions of distributive justice or the health economists' Quality-Adjusted Life 
Year (QALY) to determine the answer is to assume that there really is a correct answer here, 
that the choice is not morally arbitrary.
i
  Why should that be the case?  This at least needs a lot 
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of argument – it should not be an assumption of the discourse.  There is a danger, as we'll see, 
that if we participate seriously in the rationing debate, we may end up judging the adequacy of 
a theory precisely with reference to its ability to deliver apparently determinate answers to 
questions which, our sound moral intuitions tell us, should not have any such answer.  In such 
cases, the theory functions to enable those making policy decisions to claim an authoritative, 
rational status for choices that would otherwise be perceived as arbitrary. 
 
Should literally any question about what one ought to do admit of a determinate answer, 
whatever the options presented and whatever the background conditions restricting the 
options?  Bioethics discourse has produced its share of bizarre discussions of what one should 
do in imaginary cases, that in fact only served to illustrate the absurdity of some questions 
beginning: “What should you do if...?” 
4 
(p6)  Years ago I was asked what I should do if a 
James Bond villain tells me to shoot five delegates at a bioethics conference – or else his 
associate will set off a bomb in the main lecture theatre killing many more, perhaps all the 
delegates.  When I refused to answer, I was made to feel like the celebrity mentioned in my 
first paragraph, confronted with an insistent request for a 'straight  answer' to a question that 
does not admit of one.  For clearly, there is no non-absurd, non-offensive way to reason my 
way to an answer as to which delegates I “should” kill.  Should I target the old, those who 
look ill, or maybe even the disabled, making all manner of assumptions that many would 
regard quite rightly as utterly offensive, as to how we measure the value of a person's life?  Of 
course not.  If the death of at least five of the delegates really was unavoidable (and if I 
regarded myself as responsible not only for what I did but for what my actions and omissions 
led to others doing) then I should admit that the choice as to which people I select is random, 
morally arbitrary.
ii
  But surely, my reasoning would be better employed in considering ways 
that I might avoid the problem altogether and get the better of the villain.  Similarly, in the 
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real case of the choice between the two groups of patients, might not our reasoning faculties 
be better employed in thinking of ways to arrange our social order such that the needs of both 
the thoroughly deserving groups in the example could be met – ie engaging in the sort of 
political discourse that is ruled beyond the remit of the rationing debate? 
 
In contrast to his critics, Wyller sees his primary obligation as to the patient in front of him, 
not to the politician whose job it is to make the whole system 'tick over' effectively.
7 
(pp259-
60)  Utilising the insights of Aristotle and Levinas in his search for a “moral framework” for 
the role of caregiver, he argues for a form of “moral nearsightedness” exemplified by the New 
Testament's Good Samaritan: 
 
“The Samaritan did not consider whether part of his limited resources should be reserved for 
another individual or spread among all the poor in Palestine.  His moral obligation was 
awakened by the particular individual in need.”(p260) 
 
According to Wyller's version of the “ethics of proximity”(p257), for each of us it is true that: 
my moral remit is determined by the needs of the person the New Testament would identify as 
my “neighbour”: “every human being who incidentally comes in my way deserves my 
compassionate care”.(op.cit) 
 
Far from viewing this mentality as socially irresponsible, I think Shaw would point out that it 
is in fact this sort of “unreasonable” refusal to make the system tick over that creates a 
political imperative for change.  If a system prevents us from giving people the care they 
deserve, then that system represents not a starting point for ethical thinking, but an arbitrary 
barrier to moral practice.  Of course, we need to recognise its reality and to understand its 
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workings, but our attitude towards it should be strategic – it is something to be negotiated, 
challenged where possible, but not willingly and routinely accommodated.  The more people 
who think like this, the more we have a 'bolshy' workforce and critical citizenry,
9
 the more we 
have a population prepared to call its political leaders to account.  The 'reasonable' clinician, 
perhaps prepared to “decry” an underfunded system, but only on his days off work, is likely to 
prove less of a challenge to underfunding and arbitrary restraint than one who, like Wyller, 
states openly that he will not “try” to accommodate demands incompatible with his own, 
thought-through ethic of care.  If workers who do the jobs that really matter do start to 
demand, en masse, to be properly resourced, and if they win the support of the public in doing 
so, then perhaps we could see some genuine social progress.  In the meantime, if Wyller 
manages to win better treatment for his patients then he will not repent or see himself as 'the 
cause' of other patients losing out – as though he were responsible morally for the economic 
constraints on the system which he did not create. 
 
Causal reasoning in the rationing debate 
In response, Magelssen et al might protest that he is responsible.  He did not create the 
constraints within which he must practice, but he is responsible for being aware that the 
system is resource-constrained.  It follows, logically, that any additional benefits he secures 
for his patients will be achieved at a cost to patients elsewhere.  As Alan Williams, the health 
economist and inventor of the QALY used to say, “in a resource-constrained system 'cost' 
means 'sacrifice'.” 
10
 (p223)  They give an example which they believe illustrates this point 
effectively. 
 
In Norway, “breast cancer patients who had undergone mastectomy bared their scars at a rally 
outside of parliament, in order to protest the long waiting lists for reconstructive surgery” 
3 
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(p3) as part of an ultimately successful campaign on the part of these patients to improve their 
lot.  Far from congratulating the campaigners, the authors report that it was later 
“acknowledged” (by the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services) that “this 
allocation of healthcare resources at the macro level had the very unfortunate side-effect of 
increasing waiting lists for surgery for children with cleft lip and palate”.(p3)  In other words, 
the politicians who made the concession chose not to increase the overall health budget – not 
to charge a little more in taxes to the super-rich or large corporations, not to cut spending on 
armaments, on their own salaries and perks or indeed the inflated salaries of game show hosts 
and other socially useless
iii
 celebrities (no doubt because they understood that such options 
were 'beyond their remit').  Instead they transferred the money from somewhere else in the 
health system and the children became what Williams would call the “sacrifice” in this case. 
 
Magelssen et al describe this as a “side-effect” of the campaigners' actions.  It's worth noting 
that this is a causal claim: to say X is a “side-effect” of Y is surely to to attribute causal 
responsibility to Y for X.  So they seem to be attributing responsibility for the suffering of the 
children to the women who bravely campaigned for an end to their own suffering, and to all 
who supported them.  If this is not what they are doing, then what exactly is the point they are 
making via this example? 
 
How do they arrive at this causal claim? The manner of reasoning here seems straightforward: 
they consider a counter-factual statement that 'had that money not been spent on the one group 
of patients, it could have been spent on the other,' note its truth and promptly conclude that the 
spending on the one group caused/rendered inevitable the cuts to spending on the other.  But 
in that case, any number of other counter-factual propositions could provide an equally 
credible basis for the attribution of causal responsibility.  Had the politicians made a different 
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decision resulting in one of the alternatives listed above, then both the breast cancer patients 
and the children awaiting surgery could have been funded, while (for instance) the profits of 
the makers of Norway's Got Talent could have been taxed more heavily.  So the profits of the 
makers of that particular exploitative pulp entertainment show could equally be characterised 
as the cause of the children's suffering.  (As could expenditure on armaments &etc.)  The 
point is, it is all a matter of which counter-factual you are prepared to consider, and the range 
of counter-factual possibilities the authors are prepared to consider is quite simply a result of 
their stipulation that they will only consider possibilities delimited by the health budget as it 
so happens to be fixed.  There is no more 'objective' reason for this stipulation than the fact 
that this is the declared remit of their discourse.  The question then arises, for Wyller and 
others: what rational grounds have you given me to want to be part of that discourse?  Why 
not be part of a less restrictive discourse, that allows us to consider broader social factors in 
our analysis of the causes and what is/is not “avoidable”?  The question is not which realities 
we are aware of, but the moral significance we accord to them in determining our own 
thinking and actions.  While it might well serve the interests of the minister for health to wish 
to restrict all thinking to the options available given 'the system as it is', it is by no means clear 
why that is a useful or even morally acceptable starting point for clinicians or indeed for 
citizens.  It must sometimes be part of our role to do all we can to challenge the limits 
imposed upon us.  To consider another counter-factual possibility: the citizens of Norway 
could have had as vociferous a campaign for the children with cleft lip and palate as the one 
launched for the breast cancer patients.  It need not have been restricted to the citizens of 
Norway – I could have joined the campaign.  So we all bear responsibility for the failures of 
the system, every time we tolerate injustice, every time we rationalise the suffering of another 
human being. 
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Making progress 
What concerns me about the view of Magelssen et al is the sense coming across from their 
paper that such broader political questions can be neatly ruled off from any discussion of the 
ethics of practice, and a subsequent lack of investigation of their own role as theorists.  We all 
agree that sometimes professionals will not be able to 'defend their corner' in the way I have 
used this term, and the economic constraints upon them will force them to provide sub-
optimal care to their patients.  It is not clear that, when this happens, there need be any non-
arbitrary answer to the question: who should suffer?  To act as though there must be, to make 
it one's job to find this answer, may seem commendable, but it may serve to place a rational 
gloss on brute factors whose arbitrariness really should be made clear to all, such that people 
actually start to have the feelings of outrage that Magelssen et al seem, at times, to be 
disparaging (see the previous point about “sentimentality”). 
 
Historically, arrangements we would now regard as wildly irrational and patently unjust have 
been defended by those who noted that changing them was 'unrealistic' – where being 
unrealistic means calling for something that is simply not viable given background economic 
arrangements that are considered beyond the remit of the topic under discussion.  Some slave 
societies are better and some are worse than others, and the same can be said of particular 
slave owners.  So it might have seemed 'reasonable' at certain points in human history to 
develop an 'ethics of slavery', to encourage more 'ethical' slave owners for the benefit of 
slaves.  The problem with this idea is that slavery is inherently immoral, so any such 'ethic' is 
patently untenable: 
 
“If our starting point is a slave society and that ‘background context’ is outside the scope of 
our discussion, we simply cannot arrive at a solution to the problem of how to organise the 
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production of life’s necessities that is ‘fair to all concerned’.  Why should we just assume that 
our own place in history is so much more fortunate, that given this starting point we can find 
rational and fair solutions to our social problems without fundamental social change?” 
6 
(p59) 
 
Is it not even possible that our current social and economic arrangements – with all of the 
inequality and suffering they necessitate – are the real problem, in the same way that (most of 
us readily accept) the underlying social and economic arrangements in many earlier human 
societies were the true obstacles to justice and social progress?  In that case we need to be 
very careful, as theorists, about work we do that might serve to vindicate such arrangements: 
 
“By offering solutions to practical problems via rational methods, ethicists confirm that 
‘rational’ and ‘ethical’ solutions are possible within the present political environment: it is not 
that the environment must change radically if reason is to survive at all, but rather rational 
debate can flourish provided it accepts certain arbitrary limits placed upon it.  By agreeing to 
work within the confines of ‘realistic’ assumptions, such theorists may find that their work 
functions to underwrite the very conceptions of reality and practice which must change if 
social rationality is even to be possible.” 
4
(p155) 
 
Consider the response of Magelssen et al to Wyller's claim that the application of universal 
moral principles to determine “fair” decisions in particular cases led to morally “arbitrary” 
outcomes, while his preferred “ethics of proximity” furnished the role of caregiver with a 
moral framework.  Their answer reflects what I have elsewhere characterised as an 
assumption about proper methodology in applied ethics.
5
  They answer that, if rationing is 
unavoidable given the system as it is (which they believe they have demonstrated to be a fact) 
then “a well-developed modern professional ethic ought to be able to incorporate and justify 
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notions of justice and rationing” and their concern about “proximity and care ethics 
approaches” is that they may be “simply unsuited to provide such an ethical framework for 
medicine”.(p6)  This does suggest they regard it as the job of applied moral theorists to 
explain, given the world as it is, how non-arbitrary solutions are in fact possible, however 
intuitively unfair and arbitrary the rationing process might appear to the ethically untrained. 
 
Such theorists risk becoming implicit apologists for the political status quo.  When one 
considers the sheer irrationality of the broader social order, that allows the salary of an 
individual CEO to exceed the entire health budget of a developing world nation, while 
something in the region of 29,000 children per day die in the developing world from poverty-
related disease and malnutrition,
11
 the desire to be “reasonable” in their sense, to frame one's 
moral thinking with reference to the need to keep the system as it is ticking over, might 
depreciate.  It is by large numbers of people failing (or indeed refusing) to work within the 
current realities that we have the best hope of actually changing those realities. 
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i Or at the very least, that the employment of the relevant theory somehow renders the whole process more 
rational, more justified than one where decisions were made by some patently arbitrary process, such as a 
lottery. 
ii A reviewer for this journal suggests this claim commits me to the view that “all moral decisions are 
arbitrary”. It doesn't. The denial of the claim that “literally any question about what one ought to do admits 
of a determinate answer” does not imply the assertion that “no question about what one ought to do 
admits of a determinate answer”. Given the choice between not killing anyone at the conference and killing 
five delegates, I should clearly make the decision not to kill anyone! (Anyone who purports to disagree is 
either disingenuous or psychotic.) But if you insist on saying: “But suppose you simply have to kill five 
people, how should you select them?” then there is no reason to assume that I must be able to supply a 
non-arbitrary answer to that particular question. To assume that you can set up any situation you like, limit 
the choices available in any way you like, then wheel in Kantian, utilitarian or some other moral theory to 
provide a determinate answer to the question “so what should you do?” is to abuse these moral theories
4 
: 
they were designed to consider fundamental questions about the nature of moral thinking, not to 
rationalise any decision you may care to make or to prove that there just has to be a determinate answer to 
literally any question you care to frame.  
iii A reviewer points out that this is a “value-loaded” term, as is my previous use of the term “bolshy” and my 
later assertion that shows like Britain's Got Talent, America's Got Talent, Norway's Got Talent and (by 
implication) all the other members of the “Got Talent” family are “exploitative”. Let's be clear, there is 
nothing whatsoever to be ashamed of in being a “bolshy” worker: the whole point of this paper is to praise 
the “unreasonable” worker who defends her/his corner in the sense I explain. So there is nothing pejorative 
about this term. The same cannot be said for terms like “useless” and “exploitative”. My view is that a TV 
show which invites desperate and often deeply misguided people to prove they “have talent” in front of a 
panel of wealthy celebrities, to be routinely subjected to public humiliation (except in the rare cases where a 
true “gem” is found, and instantly signed up to an extremely restrictive contract by the show's multi-
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millionaire founder) is indeed “exploitative”. If there were such a thing as the Platonic Form of Exploitation 
then this show would be it. Frankly, the term “useless” is far too moderate a characterisation of its founder 
and key presenter, known affectionately as “Mr Nasty” by his admirers for the hilarious way he “savages” 
the array of “flops” paraded before him while “earning” his annual income of something in excess of £50 
million. 
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I thank the reviewer for these comments. I'll try to respond to them below, indicating where I have 
revised the paper in response to the comments. 
SUMMARY:  
In this article, the author argues that by being “reasonable” and accepting the “unavoidability of 
rationing”, health care ethicists are in fact neglecting important larger ethical and political issues, as 
well as endorsing “the very structures that need to change if real moral progress is to be made”. The 
author furthermore argues that certain lines of ethical reasoning, here illustrated by an article by 
Magelssen et al, provide a false sheen of “non-arbitrariness” to (higher-order) priority decisions. Yes 
that's a fair summary of the key claims of the paper. 
COMMENTS REGARDING THE ARGUMENTATION:  
Whereas I find the author’s claim that ethicists ought to scrutinize “the larger picture” relevant and 
interesting, I am less convinced by the discussion on “arbitrariness”. The two are intrinsically linked: it 
is the failure to consider the broader picture that renders the solutions offered morally arbitrary.  All 
in all, it seems that the author claims that all moral decisions are arbitrary (?), see especially pg 8, 
lines 52-54. If so, the problem cannot be that “higher-order” priority setting decisions are arbitrary 
whereas those made by the physician are not, but rather that any claim by anybody that their 
decisions are “non-arbitrary” is invalid. This point could be more clearly spelled out. This is a rather 
puzzling reading which must reflect significant differences in our intellectual starting points. I have 
been criticised before by bioethicists who (correctly) identified my metaethical presuppositions as 
realist. No-one thus far has thought my arguments presupposed that 'all moral decisions are 
arbitrary'. I have added a footnote at the point you reference (p8, line 54) which hopefully makes it 
clear why this is a misreading. (Actually it's an endnote so the text appears on p17 of the revised 
document.) Hopefully the note is not too blunt (apologies if it is) but I am attempting to be succinct. A 
full exposition of my own position in metaethics is not needed here and would lead the discussion 
away from the main subject matter. You later raise concerns about too much 'autocitation', so 
expounding further on what I have argued elsewhere would not, I take it, be welcomed. 
Furthermore, the author claims (on pg 7, lines 50-57) that  ”to use some theoretical device …. is to 
assume that there really is a correct answer here, that the choice is not morally arbitrary”. I do not 
agree with this claim. For instance, considerations of procedural justice may apply. What precisely is 
being claimed here? That you can employ a theoretical device such as the QALY, or a Rawlsian 
conception of procedural justice, but admit that there is no correct answer, that the choice is 
arbitrary? People can make arbitrary choices without the help of bioethicists, so what role, then, does 
the theoretical device play – other than to give the appearance of a non-arbitrary solution? One 
possibility is that you are appealing here to the Rawlsian idea of 'pure procedural justice' and the 
distinction between the justice of processes and of outcomes.  But to say that such considerations 
'may apply' here is not to say that choices are 'arbitrary': a defender of pure procedural justice would 
argue that, once the 'right' process has been adopted, whatever outcome ensues it is justified 
precisely as the outcome of the right process – on such a view, that is the only justification it needs, 
and to say it is justified is, precisely, to deny that it is an arbitrary choice. Again, I have added an 
endnote at the point you reference (p7, line 57 – the text again appearing on p17) which hopefully 
expands on this point, bringing in the possibility of a procedural approach. 
More importantly, any system of ethics is contingent upon accepting some sort of moral ground, be it 
principlist, Kantian, or utilitarian. As soon as this is done subsequent choices are not in fact 
“arbitrary”. So it seems you now agree with my claim that to employ such a device is to assume or 
imply that the choice is not morally arbitrary. You surely are not saying that any evocation of 
theoretical language guarantees that the theory is being legitimately employed and that its 
employment really does provide an adequate justification of the conclusion reached? As I say in the 
two sentences which immediately follow the one you quote, that is precisely the point that needs 
arguing – it should not be an assumption of the discourse. 
Equally, I do not agree with the author when he writes that “if a system prevents us from giving 
people the care they deserve, then that system represents… an arbitrary barrier” (pg 9). The problem, 
in that case, is not that the system is arbitrary but that it is ethically flawed. You could make a good 
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case for saying the system is 'ethically flawed' but there is no logical incompatibility with that use of 
language and my own. (But your preferred use of language encourages you to move to the point 
below.) 
Summing up, I feel that the reasoning about “arbitrariness” should either be developed further, or 
downplayed. I would also like to know just what the author recommends instead of the 
“arbitrariness” of the model proposed by Magelssen et al. I think it's here that the differences 
between our intellectual starting points (what I call our conceptions about the proper 'remit' of our 
enquiry and its effects on our assumptions about proper methodology) really come into play. You 
already know that I support Wyller's view about doing the best for the patient in front of you, as 
expressed in his 'Good Samaritan' argument quoted on my p9. But that strikes you as patently 
incomplete, failing to answer the most obvious and pertinent questions. Your natural assumption is 
that, if I think a particular overall system is 'ethically flawed', then I should be able to propose/ 
'recommend' a better model that can realistically be achieved given the world as it is. (Or else I am 
not understanding 'the facts'or being 'realistic' – see your [mocking?] use of these terms in inverted 
commas below.) Yours is a popular conception of the 'pragmatic' and the 'realistic', one with a huge 
influence on debates in bioethics, but it is not mine. Pragmatic questions are ones which face real 
people in their particular situations. This is precisely why I prefer the language of 'arbitrariness' to 
that of a system being 'ethically flawed'. At any particular point in history, people can be faced with 
systems constraining their behaviour that have simply evolved: they have not been designed as some 
sort of overarching moral plan – there isn't a flaw in the plan but rather there is no plan. As I have 
argued extensively in the texts and papers you suggest I cite too much, the best we can do in such a 
context is, as Aristotle advised, to attempt to preserve our integrity in contexts which will tend to 
corrupt us. The best way to bring about progress in the 'overall' system is for the Wyllers of this world 
to continue to resist the arbitrary constraints of the system they have to work with – not to attempt 
to bring work such as Kant's (which was in fact designed to understand fundamental philosophical 
questions about reasoning) to find 'rational' or 'ethical' solutions to problems within contexts he 
could never have envisaged. (This is arguably an abuse of his work, but again, to go into this in more 
detail would mean more 'autocitation'. I've added a reference to this point to the second endnote, 
appearing on p17. Beyond that, I'd like to trust any reader who wants more detail on this argument to 
follow-up the references already in the article. I can't make anyone do this, I can't stop people from 
simply assuming I'm wrong about something without even reading the work I cite in support of my 
claims, but I naively hope that academics won't proceed in that way.) 
Regardless of “higher order” policy decisions, physicians will always be faced with priority setting 
decisions (How long to spend with this patient? What ailment to treat first? etc). Given this “fact” (or 
am I being too “realistic” here?), what indeed should inform the physician in such decisions? Non-
arbitrary decisions from within the physicians “defended corner”, that is: from close to the clinical 
reality, perhaps influenced by the author’s preferred “ethics of proximity”? Or should physicians’ 
decisions be informed by other, less arbitrary “higher-order” principles – if so, which are these 
principles? Or should each physician embrace the “arbitrariness” of ethical decision-making, 
prioritizing as he/she chooses? To my mind, this would inevitably lead to injustice and 
unpredictability for the patient, as well as a lack of transparency regarding ethics in health care. The 
author’s developed view on this issue would lend further relevance to the present article. See my 
previous response. If the only decision the system allows us is just plain arbitrary (eg either cut the 
spending to the women with breast cancer or the children with cleft lip and palate) then we should 
admit it, and get angry about it – not rationalise it by acting as though Kant's ethics can somehow 
resolve a problem Kant never set out to solve. To bring in such theoretical language is not to create 
transparency but the very opposite: to make an arbitrary decision seem non-arbitrary and to distract 
attention from the social conditions that require that choice. There could indeed be a non-arbitrary 
answer, even at what you call the 'higher order' level eg spend on both sets of patients by cutting the 
money spent on WMDs or charging a higher rate of tax to Simon Cowell and his cohorts. But if you 
tell me such alternatives are ruled out and I must choose between the two sets of patients, then the 
choice in that case is arbitrary, and the transparent, honest response is to admit this. The very fact 
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that in many practical contexts, practitioners may be able to make non-arbitrary choices does not in 
any way imply that all choices about 'rationing' must be non-arbitrary. 
I also wish to disagree when the author, on pg 11, claims that Magelssen et al ”attribute 
responsibility” by describing as a ”side-effect” the transfer of money from somewhere else in the 
health system (from the care of children with cleft palate) to ”the women who bravely campaigned 
for an end to their own suffering”. Describing this transfer as a side-effect needs not necessarily entail 
claiming that the women are responsible for the fate of the children – compare for instance the 
“doctrine of double effect”, or Schlomi Segalls insistence that responsibility hinges on whether the 
outcomes (of an action) are such that “it would have been unreasonable to expect them to avoid” 
(Segall: Health, Luck and Justice, pg 13). This matter could be explored further. This is a point of logic. 
The section is entitled 'Causal reasoning in the rationing debate' and the paragraph you quote makes 
it very clear that what is being discussed is a claim about causal responsibility: the claim that A is a 
'side-effect' of B is the attribution of causal responsibility for A to B. Considerations of the Double 
Effects Doctrine in no way contradict this straightforward point – and if Maelssen et al are not making 
this causal claim, then their use of the example in context simply has no relevance to the point they 
are making.  The principle of charity suggests I should read them as making sense: I therefore read 
them as making the causal claim I attribute to them.  The DDE concerns attempts to avoid moral 
responsibility for certain forseeable and unpleasant consequences by construing them as 'side-
effects' of intended actions, not to alter the logic of the term 'side-effect'. 
COMMENTS REGARDING LANGUAGE AND STYLE: 
•       I would suggest substituting the word “remit” with limits or scope as these are more common in 
the debate on priority setting in health care. For reasons suggested above, the word 'remit' seems to 
me important here. My argument is that many contributors to debates about rationing still seem to 
treat identifying 'the problems' as a fairly straightforward, empirical exercise, because their evaluative 
'remit' is such that they won't consider the possibility that any serious changes to the overall political 
system might be morally required. (Or they just don't see that as 'relevant' to the debate they are 
having.) So they see no need to spell out, let alone justify, the moral assumptions underlying their 
own picture of social reality and their 'pragmatic' solutions to 'the problems' they discuss.  It's as 
though their position is morally neutral, while it's only radical critics of the status quo who need to 
explain and justify their moral presuppositions. The purpose of my arguments is, precisely, to 
challenge that 'remit' as intellectually 'arbitrary'. 
•       The author in several places uses what I perceive as value loaded terms. On pg 4: “protect their 
traditional values and practices from random transformation to suit the prevailing political currents 
and economic agendas”; on pg 10: “… the more we have a bolshy workforce”; on pg 11 “socially 
useless celebrities”; on pg 12: ”that particular exploitative pulp entertainment show”. My strong 
recommendation would be to replace all such value loaded terms with more neutral phrasings. I do 
not wish to pretend my own position is morally neutral – given the nature of my criticisms of other 
commentators, that would be grotesque hypocricy on my part. I've added another endnote (p11, text 
appearing on p17) owning up to the value-loaded nature of such phrases and suggesting possible 
justification for the relevant evaluations. Obviously, I realize that such a recommendation may be 
perceived as yet another way of “protecting from scrutiny” some aspects of the way the current 
system functions, or indeed as lending legitimacy to “Norway’s got talent”. This is not my intention, 
but rather I argue that any normative claims should be clearly spelled out in an ethics article. For 
instance, if the author wants to push one of the above points, this can be done in a separate section 
(or indeed a separate article) entitled “Why celebrities are socially useless and what to do about the 
situation” rather than merely suggesting the “uselessness” of celebrities in a side passage.  If you 
seriously want me to submit a further article detailing the many ways in which mass culture degrades 
human beings and impoverishes rational and moral discourse then I can submit it. (Not sure if it 
would fit in with the stated aims and scope of this particular journal though.) I could add another 
reference to a place where I present arguments on the general decay of popular debate, and its 
effects on academic debate, but that would involve more 'autocitation'. For now see if the added 
endnote does the job. 
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•       On pg 13 line 16 I think the text should read “there need be”, not “there need by”. Many thanks! 
Altered as you suggest. 
•       I feel there is too much autocitation in the last section entitled “Making progress”, pp 13-16. The 
same (interesting!) content can be brought out without reproducing bulky quotes from previously 
published work.  OK see my above points on this issue and my efforts to keep 'autocitation' to a 
minimum, compatible with actually communicating the points being made in this paper: hence the 
restriction of direct quotes from my own previous work to two in the pages cited. 
•       I suggest rewriting the very last sentence (“It is by large numbers of people failing to work within 
the current realities that those realities change”), as this is making rather a steep empirical claim. 
Especially I recommend exchanging “failing” with some other term (refusing?) as the phrasing “failing 
to work within the current realities” to me rather suggest that they are unemployed or working in the 
black market. OK I'll change the wording here: see p15. 
Page 21 of 21 Clinical Ethics
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
